The strategic task facing Türkiye is to uphold the Montreux Convention without compromise, mitigate the impact of the war on maritime trade, and take the lead in restoring safe navigation in the Black Sea

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Approximately 83 years separate the outbreak of the Second World War from the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine War. Yet an examination of the impact of these two conflicts on maritime commerce in the Black Sea reveals that, despite profound changes in military technology and geopolitical circumstances, the fundamental strategic logic of maritime trade warfare remains largely unchanged. In both periods, the Black Sea has served not merely as a theatre of naval operations but also as a strategically vital maritime basin for the control of energy resources, critical raw materials, grain exports, and international sea lines of communication. During the Second World War, maritime trade warfare was conducted primarily through submarines, torpedoes, and naval mines. Today, similar strategic objectives are pursued through unmanned surface and aerial systems, long-range missiles, electronic warfare, and various instruments of economic coercion. Although the methods have evolved, the underlying objective remains constant: to undermine an adversary’s economic and military resilience by disrupting maritime transportation and commercial supply chains.

At the center of this historical continuity lies Türkiye’s unique geopolitical position. During both conflicts, Türkiye, despite not being a direct belligerent, has been profoundly affected by the military balance in the Black Sea and developments in maritime commerce. The present situation, however, has evolved beyond attacks by belligerent states against merchant shipping. From the perspective of maritime security, developments have long since exceeded the limits of what Türkiye can reasonably tolerate. Attacks and security incidents within Turkish territorial waters, naval mines drifting into Turkish territorial and internal waters, and uncontrolled, abandoned, or drifting vessels running aground along the Turkish coastline demonstrate that the war now poses direct threats to Türkiye’s maritime security, navigational safety, coastal environment, and economic interests. These are not isolated incidents but rather the spillover effects of an armed conflict extending into areas under Turkish sovereignty and jurisdiction. Consequently, the issue is no longer confined to protecting Turkish-flagged merchant vessels on the high seas. It now concerns the protection of navigation, human life, property, and maritime activities within Türkiye’s own maritime zones.

In my Substack article entitled ‘’Maritime Trade Warfare in the Black Sea: 83 Years Later’’, published on 9 August 2026, I examined the historical parallels between these two conflicts. A defining characteristic shared by the maritime security challenges of the Second World War and those arising from the current Russia–Ukraine War is the exposure of neutral states’ maritime commerce to belligerent military operations, including beyond the immediate areas of hostilities. During the Second World War, Türkiye’s neutrality did not prevent Turkish merchant vessels and seafarers from becoming targets of attacks. Comparable threats have re-emerged in the present conflict. Under international law, however, the mere fact that a merchant vessel may contribute economically to a belligerent’s war effort does not automatically deprive a neutral-flagged vessel of the legal protections to which it is entitled. The enduring strategic lesson for Türkiye is therefore unmistakable: neutrality does not guarantee maritime security. When the consequences of armed conflict extend to the territorial waters, merchant vessels, and maritime trade routes of neutral states, the challenge transcends commercial navigation and becomes a direct matter of sovereignty and national security.

These developments now demand a concrete strategic initiative. Türkiye must assume a more proactive role and take the lead in safeguarding maritime trade and navigational security in the Black Sea. The protection of maritime commerce cannot be left to the military priorities of the belligerents, cycles of retaliation, or the expectation that the conflict will eventually subside on its own. While preserving the strategic and legal framework established by the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, Türkiye should spearhead the development of an active, regionally coordinated maritime security architecture. Such a framework should encompass enhanced maritime domain awareness, mine countermeasure operations, early-warning mechanisms, the protection of merchant shipping, and institutionalized coordination among the Black Sea littoral states. This initiative should be grounded in regional ownership, respect for sovereignty, and the principles of international maritime law, with the ultimate objective of safeguarding freedom of navigation, protecting legitimate maritime commerce, and preventing the further expansion of the conflict’s consequences into the maritime domains of non-belligerent states.

Maritime Trade Losses Suffered by Neutral Türkiye During the Second World War

Throughout the Second World War, Türkiye largely maintained its neutrality and implemented Article 19 of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, restricting the passage of belligerent warships through the Turkish Straits. Although this policy reduced the risk of Türkiye being drawn into the conflict, it could not guarantee maritime security in the Black Sea. Following Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the Black Sea became a critical maritime logistics theatre supporting operations on the Eastern Front. Romania’s Ploiești oilfields, the Port of Constanța, the Danube transportation network, and Soviet supply routes linking Crimea and the Caucasus emerged as strategically significant objectives. Naval warfare in the region focused less on major fleet engagements than on the control and disruption of ports, coastal shipping, minefields, and merchant maritime traffic.

Under the severe economic constraints imposed by the war, Türkiye sought to maintain the transportation of coal, chromium ore, grain, and other essential commodities through the ports of Istanbul, Zonguldak, Samsun, and Trabzon. However, the belligerents’ treatment of maritime transportation as a legitimate instrument of economic warfare exposed the neutral Turkish merchant fleet to considerable danger. Particularly between 1941 and 1944, numerous Turkish merchant vessels were sunk or damaged in attacks carried out by, or attributed to, Soviet submarines. Although historical compilations associate several incidents with Soviet submarine operations, the identity of the attacking forces cannot be established with equal certainty in every case. Nevertheless, these evidentiary limitations do not diminish the broader historical conclusion that Türkiye’s neutral merchant fleet suffered substantial losses because of submarine warfare. The principal strategic objective of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was to disrupt Axis maritime transportation, thereby weakening the German war economy and undermining military operations on the Eastern Front. Within this strategic context, shipments of chromium ore and other critical raw materials from Türkiye to Romania and Bulgaria could be perceived as potential targets because of their contribution to the Axis war effort.

The Limitations of Montreux and the Human Dimension of Maritime Security

The Montreux Convention constitutes an indispensable strategic achievement for Turkish sovereignty and the preservation of the naval balance in the Black Sea. During the Second World War, Türkiye’s implementation of the Convention’s wartime provisions restricted the entry of external belligerent naval forces into the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits. Similarly, following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine War in 2022, the application of Article 19 established an important legal barrier against the further expansion of the naval dimension of the conflict through the deployment of additional belligerent warships from outside the region. Nevertheless, Germany’s transfer of six Type IIB submarines to Constanța during the Second World War, following their dismantling and transportation through a combination of the Elbe River, overland routes, and the Danube, demonstrated the distinction between the legal scope of the Montreux regime and the practical realities of maritime security in the Black Sea.

The Montreux Convention primarily governs the passage of vessels through the Turkish Straits. It does not constitute a comprehensive maritime security mechanism capable of guaranteeing merchant shipping protection, mine clearance, port security, or the prevention of attacks at sea. The sinking of neutral Turkish merchant vessels during the Second World War, together with refugee tragedies occurring near the Turkish coastline, exposed the profound humanitarian consequences of these limitations. Today, unmanned surface and aerial systems, long-range missiles, and drifting naval mines have rendered the same underlying security challenge considerably more complex. Maritime security must therefore be understood as extending beyond military deterrence to encompass navigational safety, search and rescue capabilities, and the protection of the lives of seafarers, passengers, and refugees.

Türkiye’s strategic priority should be to assume a leading role in regional maritime security while preserving the Montreux framework and avoiding any expansion of the military presence of non-littoral powers in the Black Sea. Within this framework, the immediate objective should be to facilitate an agreement between Russia and Ukraine providing for the reciprocal cessation of attacks against civilian merchant vessels, commercial ports, and maritime transportation infrastructure. Should such an agreement prove unattainable, priority must be given to strengthening maritime surveillance, early-warning systems, mine countermeasure capabilities, navigational safety, and crisis communication mechanisms. The fundamental strategic imperative is to complement the legal and geopolitical balance established by Montreux with effective maritime security arrangements. Türkiye must seek to protect human life and maritime commerce without contributing to an escalation or geographical expansion of the conflict. In this respect, the preservation of the Montreux regime and the establishment of a functional, littoral-state-led maritime security architecture should be regarded not as competing objectives, but as mutually reinforcing pillars of stability in the Black Sea.

The Transformation of Maritime Security During the Russia–Ukraine War

The war that began with Russia’s large-scale military offensive against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has placed the Black Sea at the center of one of the most serious maritime security crises since the Second World War. During the initial phase of the conflict, Russia exploited the superiority of its Black Sea Fleet to impose a de facto blockade of Ukrainian ports, substantially disrupting exports through Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhny. The interruption of Ukrainian grain exports demonstrated how a regional armed conflict could generate far-reaching consequences for global food prices and international supply chains. Against this background, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by Türkiye and the United Nations in July 2022, represented not merely a diplomatic compromise but a strategically significant maritime security arrangement. As the conflict progressed, however, the operational character of naval warfare underwent a fundamental transformation. Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels progressively eroded the conventional superiority of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, while Russian missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks targeted Ukrainian ports, energy infrastructure, and grain terminals. Consequently, the conflict increasingly extended beyond attacks against merchant vessels to encompass the systematic disruption of the infrastructure upon which maritime commerce depends.

This transformation has integrated the dimensions of physical destruction, economic coercion, and technological disruption into a more complex form of maritime warfare. The submarines, torpedoes, and naval mines that characterized maritime operations during the Second World War have now been supplemented by unmanned systems, precision-guided missiles, electronic warfare capabilities, and space-based intelligence networks. Merchant vessels face not only the threat of direct kinetic attacks but also Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming, position spoofing, interference with Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, and communications disruptions. These threats increase the risks of navigational errors, unintended course deviations, collisions, and groundings. At the same time, rising war-risk insurance premiums, higher freight costs, restrictions on port operations, and difficulties affecting crew availability and welfare further undermine the commercial viability of maritime transportation. The strategic objectives of maritime warfare can now be achieved without necessarily sinking a merchant vessel. Rendering a ship uninsurable, preventing its safe access to port, or making its commercial operations economically unsustainable may produce comparable strategic effects. Maritime trade warfare has therefore evolved beyond the traditional concept of blockade into a multidimensional contest combining physical, economic, technological, and psychological instruments of coercion.

The assessment of war-risk insurance in the Black Sea does not always adequately reflect the geographical interconnectedness of the maritime domain. The designation of high-war-risk areas covering much of the basin, generally excluding the territorial waters of Türkiye, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia, illustrates the geographical scale of the threat. Nevertheless, maritime threats do not terminate at the boundaries of territorial seas or exclusive economic zones. The possibility of civilian merchant vessels flying third-country flags being damaged even within the exclusive economic zones of NATO littoral states demonstrates that maritime and land-based military operations cannot be assessed as entirely separate security environments. Moreover, the distinction between risks considered commercially acceptable by the insurance industry and conditions that are genuinely safe for navigation is of fundamental importance. Although freedom of navigation may remain legally intact, the practical ability to exercise that freedom safely has become severely constrained in maritime areas affected by the conflict.

The Renewed Targeting of the Turkish Merchant Fleet

In 2026, attacks against commercial shipping in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have reportedly reached an intensity that poses a serious threat to regional maritime security. During the first nine months of the year, approximately 109 merchant vessels were assessed to have been subjected to attacks, with nearly 86 vessels reportedly targeted between July and September alone. This represents almost four times the number recorded during the preceding six months. The economic consequences of these attacks have also become increasingly severe. In August, grain carrier calls at Ukrainian Black Sea ports reportedly declined by 92% compared with the previous month, while cargo-handling volumes at Odesa’s ports fell more than fifteenfold after 22 July. Significant reductions were also recorded in daily vessel traffic through the Istanbul Strait.

The most significant contemporary parallel to Türkiye’s experience during the Second World War lies in the growing threats confronting Turkish-linked merchant shipping during the Russia–Ukraine War. In my article published on 9 August 2026, I noted that between February 2022 and August 2026, at least 21 Turkish-flagged, Turkish-owned, or Turkish-operated merchant vessels had either been attacked or directly exposed to threats arising from the conflict. Particularly since late 2025, the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems and long-range strike capabilities has fundamentally altered the nature and geographical extent of these threats. Merchant vessels have increasingly become exposed to the consequences of hostilities not only in ports located within conflict zones but also on the high seas, at designated anchorages, and in maritime areas adjacent to Türkiye’s zones of jurisdiction.

Attacks affecting Turkish-linked vessels intensified in July 2026 and have continued with increasing frequency in maritime areas under Bulgarian and Romanian jurisdiction. From Türkiye’s perspective, the overriding strategic concern is the protection of Turkish maritime commerce and seafarers, irrespective of which belligerent is responsible for a particular attack. The continuation of commercial relations with either Russia or Ukraine cannot justify unlawful attacks against Turkish-linked civilian merchant vessels. The maritime security challenge that emerged during the Second World War, when Turkish merchant vessels suffered attacks attributed to Soviet submarines, has thus re-emerged under fundamentally different technological conditions and across a considerably expanded threat environment. This historical continuity underscores the necessity for Türkiye to adopt a proactive maritime security policy in the Black Sea—one that moves beyond reactive crisis management towards anticipatory risk assessment, strengthened deterrence, and the development of effective protective measures for merchant shipping and maritime personnel.

A Türkiye-Led Maritime Security Architecture for the Black Sea

Türkiye’s role in the Black Sea should not be confined to issuing diplomatic protests against attacks by the belligerents or documenting losses suffered by merchant vessels. With its naval capabilities, maritime infrastructure, sovereignty over the Turkish Straits, diplomatic experience, and established relations with the Black Sea littoral states, Türkiye possesses the strategic and institutional capacity to lead the development of an active regional maritime security architecture. Such an architecture should recognize the security of civilian maritime transportation as a shared regional interest and adopt a comprehensive approach integrating military deterrence, maritime surveillance, early warning, mine countermeasures, merchant vessel protection, energy security, and diplomatic coordination.

A Black Sea Maritime Security Coordination Mechanism, established under Türkiye’s leadership, could provide a permanent framework for cooperation, open to the participation of all littoral states and fully compatible with the Montreux regime. Although the ongoing Russia–Ukraine War may prevent the simultaneous participation of all Black Sea coastal states, a gradual and inclusive arrangement could be developed by building upon existing regional cooperation mechanisms. Türkiye has already demonstrated its capacity to initiate and institutionalize such cooperation. Under Turkish leadership, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) was established in 2001, followed by Operation Black Sea Harmony in 2004 and the Black Sea Border and Coast Guard Cooperation Forum (BSCF) in 2006. Within the BSCF framework, the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre (BSBCIC), located in Burgas, Bulgaria, operated as a mechanism designed to facilitate coordination among the National Border Coordination and Operations Centres of participating states. Having successfully pioneered these regional cooperation initiatives in the past, Türkiye should once again assume a leading role in addressing the contemporary maritime security crisis.

Risk-Based Voyage Planning for Turkish Merchant Shipping

The first operational priority of a new regional initiative should be the introduction of a comprehensive risk-based voyage planning system for Turkish merchant shipping. Continuously updated threat assessments should be prepared for Russian and Ukrainian ports affected by the conflict, anchorages located near areas of hostilities, routes exposed to naval mine threats, and strategically important energy terminals.

A clear legal distinction must be maintained between mandatory security measures applicable to Turkish-flagged vessels and advisory or coordination arrangements concerning foreign-flagged vessels under Turkish ownership or commercial operation. These categories are subject to different legal jurisdictions and regulatory obligations. The objective should not be to suspend maritime commerce but to establish a controlled, sustainable, and security-oriented operating environment in which the protection of seafarers’ lives remains the overriding consideration. Such a system should encompass voyage routes, port approaches and departures, anchorage areas, crew changes, insurance requirements, and emergency evacuation procedures. Providing shipmasters, shipowners, insurers, and relevant public authorities with access to coordinated threat assessments would improve maritime safety while reducing unnecessary economic disruption and commercial losses.

Integrated Maritime Surveillance and Early-Warning Mechanisms

The second priority should be the development of integrated maritime surveillance and early-warning capabilities. Contemporary maritime security depends not merely on the physical presence of naval forces but increasingly on the timely detection, identification, assessment, and dissemination of information concerning emerging threats. Under Türkiye’s leadership, a regional early-warning network could integrate coastal radar systems, satellite imagery, Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance, electronic intelligence, meteorological information, and maritime traffic analysis.

Such an integrated framework would facilitate the earlier identification of drifting naval mines, suspicious unmanned surface vessels, and hazardous navigation areas. Regular navigational warnings should also address Global Positioning System and Global Navigation Satellite System (GPS/GNSS) jamming, position spoofing, and communications disruptions. Alternative navigation and position-fixing procedures should be developed to strengthen the resilience of merchant shipping against electronic interference. While the confidentiality of sensitive military intelligence must be preserved, information essential to civilian maritime safety should be shared through clearly defined channels. Attention should be given to preventing the misuse of maritime security information in ways that could confer an operational military advantage upon either belligerent.

Expanding Mine Countermeasure Cooperation into a Comprehensive Regional Security Framework

The third priority should be to transform existing mine countermeasure cooperation into a broader maritime security coordination framework. The Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group, established through an agreement signed by Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria on 11 January 2024 and activated on 1 July 2024, demonstrates that Black Sea littoral states are capable of developing cooperative responses to shared maritime security challenges through their own resources and capabilities.

Building upon this arrangement, cooperation could be expanded in mine detection and neutralization, information exchange, maritime traffic warnings, and search and rescue coordination. However, naval mines represent only one dimension of the contemporary threat environment. Unmanned maritime and aerial systems, long-range precision strikes, electronic warfare, and threats against ports and energy terminals must also be incorporated into regional security planning. Drawing upon the operational experience of existing arrangements, a broader coordination mechanism involving both military and civilian institutions would give practical expression to Türkiye’s longstanding preference for a regional security framework based on the primacy of Black Sea littoral states.

Within this process, the littoral identity of Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria should take precedence over their institutional affiliation with NATO. From the perspective advanced in this analysis, NATO’s extensive military support for Ukraine and its increasingly confrontational relationship with Russia have brought the Alliance into a position of substantial strategic involvement in the conflict, notwithstanding its formal status as a non-belligerent. Consequently, a maritime security initiative involving these three states should be explicitly structured around their responsibilities as Black Sea coastal nations rather than presented as an extension of NATO’s military posture. This distinction is essential to preserving the regional character of the initiative, reducing the risk of escalation, and maintaining channels of communication with all littoral states.

Selective Naval Escort and Protection of Merchant Shipping

The fourth area concerns the provision of naval escort and protective measures for merchant vessels operating in high-risk maritime areas when circumstances require. The losses suffered by Turkish merchant shipping during the Second World War demonstrated that neutrality and navigational warnings alone cannot guarantee the safety of commercial vessels. The proliferation of unmanned systems and long-range weapons has made this challenge considerably more complex.

Nevertheless, naval escort should not be conceived as a permanent convoy system extending across the entire Black Sea. Its possible implementation must be assessed in relation to the maritime jurisdictions of the non-belligerent littoral states—Türkiye, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania—as well as vessel nationality, coastal-state jurisdiction and consent, international law, rules of engagement, and the potential risk of military escalation.

A clear legal distinction must be maintained between protective operations conducted by Türkiye within areas under its sovereignty or jurisdiction and activities undertaken within the maritime zones of other states. In particular, the legal rights and obligations applicable in territorial seas differ from those governing exclusive economic zones and the high seas. Although naval escort cannot provide absolute protection against modern maritime threats, carefully limited protective arrangements along designated routes, for specified periods, and under appropriate diplomatic coordination could contribute to the continuity of commercial shipping.

Such measures should not be designed to draw Türkiye into the conflict as a belligerent. Their purpose must remain the protection of civilian maritime transportation in accordance with international law and the prevention of further threats to neutral shipping.

Comprehensive Protection of Energy and Port Infrastructure

The fifth priority should be the integrated protection of critical energy and port infrastructure. Beyond its importance for grain exports and general cargo transportation, the Black Sea constitutes a strategically vital maritime basin for oil and natural gas exports from Russia, Kazakhstan, and other regional producers. The Novorossiysk terminals, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) oil terminal, the Odesa port complex, the TurkStream and Blue Stream gas pipelines, and coastal energy installations represent essential components of regional economic security.

Attacks against such infrastructure can directly affect energy supplies, tanker traffic, marine insurance markets, and freight costs, generating economic consequences far beyond the immediate conflict zone.

Accordingly, the concept of maritime security must encompass not only merchant vessels and ports but also oil terminals, subsea pipelines, submarine cables, coastal logistics facilities, and the digital systems supporting maritime operations. Physical protection, underwater surveillance, counter-unmanned-system capabilities, cybersecurity, resilience against electronic warfare, and emergency response capacity should be developed as mutually reinforcing components of an integrated security strategy. Türkiye’s strategic position within regional energy transportation networks provides an additional rationale for assuming a leading role in developing cooperative arrangements for the protection of critical maritime infrastructure.

Active Neutrality, De-escalation, and the Primacy of Regional Security

The entire strategy should be founded upon the principles of active neutrality and conflict de-escalation. Türkiye’s ability to maintain direct diplomatic communication with both Russia and Ukraine constitutes a significant strategic advantage that must be preserved. Initiatives that facilitate an expanded military presence or intervention by non-littoral powers in the Black Sea could constrain Türkiye’s geopolitical freedom of maneuver and increase the risk of further escalation.

The immediate priority should therefore not be the establishment of additional military formations but the achievement of a reciprocal cessation of attacks against merchant shipping and civilian maritime infrastructure, the prevention of the conflict’s spillover into the sovereign maritime areas of other littoral states, and the restoration of safe conditions for commercial navigation throughout the Black Sea. Türkiye’s leadership should be grounded in a strategy that preserves the Montreux regime, upholds the principle of littoral-state primacy, and places diplomatic accommodation and maritime security above military escalation.

The ultimate objective must be to establish a sustainable regional security architecture in which the protection of human life, freedom of navigation, maritime commerce, and critical infrastructure is pursued through cooperation among the Black Sea coastal states, without transforming maritime security initiatives into instruments of wider geopolitical confrontation.

The Diplomatic and Economic Dimensions of Maritime Security

Maritime security in the Black Sea cannot be ensured through military measures alone. Maritime commerce operates within a complex and interconnected system encompassing international law, diplomacy, insurance, finance, port operations, and global supply chains. Accordingly, any maritime security framework developed under Türkiye’s leadership must incorporate diplomatic and economic instruments alongside military deterrence and operational protection. In response to attacks against Turkish-flagged or Turkish-linked merchant vessels, systematic technical investigations, evidence-based attribution of responsibility, and appropriate diplomatic initiatives would strengthen the legal and institutional foundations of maritime security. At the same time, continuous coordination among shipowners, marine insurers, and relevant public authorities should address war-risk insurance, maritime financing, crew safety, port delays, and the economic sustainability of commercial voyages.

Particularly during periods when war-risk insurance premiums reach prohibitive levels or voyages to certain ports become commercially unviable, risk-sharing arrangements and financial support mechanisms should be considered to prevent the complete disruption of maritime trade. Within this framework, enhanced information exchange and institutional cooperation should be established among the Chambers of Shipping and Ministries of Transport of the Black Sea littoral states. Türkiye must therefore approach maritime security in the Black Sea not merely as a military challenge but as an integral component of national economic security and the continuity of international commerce.

Despite its membership in NATO, Türkiye has maintained relations with both Russia and Ukraine, implemented the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, and demonstrated its capacity to initiate regional maritime security cooperation. This distinctive geopolitical position enables Türkiye to develop initiatives aimed at protecting civilian maritime transportation without directly altering the military balance between the belligerents. The Black Sea Grain Initiative and the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group constitute tangible examples of this accumulated diplomatic and operational experience.

However, in this process Türkiye made two serious strategic mistakes. They were the joining the Coalition of the Willing in support of Ukraine and supplying Ukraine with Turkish-made armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Both decisions undermined Türkiye’s policy of maintaining balanced and neutral relations with Russia and Ukraine, weakened its credibility as an impartial mediator, and risked drawing Ankara closer to one side of the conflict.

In the emerging strategic environment, Türkiye’s diplomatic leadership should not be directed towards enabling either belligerent to secure military superiority over maritime transportation routes, or should it facilitate the further expansion of strategic competition involving non-littoral powers in the Black Sea. The overriding objective must be to enhance the security of civilian maritime traffic operating in accordance with international law, reinforce regional stability, and preserve the Black Sea as a reliable maritime transportation corridor for global commerce. This approach is fully consistent with Türkiye’s commitment to safeguarding the Montreux regime. The strategic significance of the Convention derives not only from its regulation of warship passage through the Turkish Straits but also from its enduring contribution to the preservation of the naval balance and regional stability in the Black Sea.

Conclusion: From the Straits Safeguarded by Montreux to a Secure Black Sea

Although approximately 83 years separate the Second World War from the present Russia–Ukraine War, the fundamental strategic logic of maritime trade warfare in the Black Sea remains largely unchanged. Weapons and technologies have evolved, yet the objective of undermining an adversary’s economic and military resilience by targeting maritime transportation has endured. Both conflicts have imparted the same historical lesson to Türkiye: remaining outside a war does not guarantee protection from its consequences at sea. The threats that once manifested themselves in the sinking of neutral Turkish merchant vessels and the loss of seafarers’ lives have now re-emerged through unmanned systems, missiles, and drifting naval mines, extending into maritime areas under Turkish jurisdiction and towards Türkiye’s coastline. The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits remains an indispensable safeguard of Turkish sovereignty and the naval balance in the Black Sea. Nevertheless, regulating the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits does not guarantee the security of merchant vessels, ports, or seafarers throughout the basin. Türkiye’s strategic responsibility is therefore to complement the legal and geopolitical advantages provided by Montreux with effective maritime security arrangements. This responsibility derives not merely from Türkiye’s naval capabilities but also from its geographical position, sovereignty over the Turkish Straits, and vital national interests in preserving stability throughout the Black Sea.

Under present circumstances, the security of maritime commerce in the Black Sea has evolved beyond an economic and diplomatic concern into a direct question of national security and sovereignty for Türkiye. The immediate priority should be a diplomatic initiative aimed at securing a reciprocal cessation of attacks by Russia and Ukraine against civilian merchant vessels, commercial ports, and maritime transportation infrastructure. Such an initiative should be reinforced by maritime surveillance, early-warning mechanisms, mine countermeasures, search and rescue capabilities, and, where necessary, protective measures consistent with international law. Any future maritime security architecture in the Black Sea should be founded upon the primary responsibility of the littoral states and regional cooperation, rather than the military priorities of external powers or the emergence of new geopolitical blocs. Türkiye’s leadership must serve not the further militarization of the Black Sea but the prevention of conflict escalation, the protection of seafarers’ lives, and the preservation of legitimate maritime commerce.

Ultimately, Türkiye faces a clear strategic imperative which is to preserve the Montreux regime without compromise, mitigate the consequences of armed conflict for maritime trade, and lead efforts to restore safe navigation throughout the Black Sea. Türkiye must move beyond its traditional role as the guardian of the Turkish Straits and a custodian of the regional naval balance to become a decisive regional actor in safeguarding peace, maritime commerce, and human life across the entire Black Sea basin. For the security of the Turkish Straits and the security of the Black Sea are strategically inseparable.

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This article was originally published on Mavi Vatan.

Ret Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Writer, Geopolitical Expert, Theorist and creator of the Turkish Bluehomeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. He served as the Chief of Strategy Department and then the head of Plans and Policy Division in Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters. As his combat duties, he has served as the commander of Amphibious Ships Group and Mine Fleet between 2007 and 2009. He retired in 2012. He established Hamit Naci Blue Homeland Foundation in 2021. He has published numerous books on geopolitics, maritime strategy, maritime history and maritime culture. He is also a honorary member of ATASAM. 

He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Featured image is from the author

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