The 81st UNGA, which is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations, was held late September 2026, in New York.

It attracted global leaders and several delegations, who delivered powerful and thought provoking speeches, topics ranging from political governance, economic development, conflicts and slavery, to cultural and humanitarian questions. Bilateral and multilateral issues also dominated the General Assembly. In this in-depth interview after the UNGA, Pradeep S. Mehta, Secretary General, CUTS International and Professor of Practice (Public Policy), JCERC University, Jaipur, discusses important aspects, emerging trends, and future perspectives at the UN General Assembly, and its likely dimensions of impact and influence on Asia and Africa. Here are the interview excerpts.

Kester Kenn Klomegah (KKK): Many important issues came up at the 81st UNGA in late September. How would you characterise the positions of Asia and Africa in a changing world?

Pradeep S. Mehta (PSM): UNGA 81 took place against a difficult backdrop. Artificial intelligence, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the US-Israel war on Iran dominated the general debate. Secretary-General Guterres, in his final address, said the world’s future would be shaped by four issues: AI, climate change, wars and inequality. The session’s theme, restoring trust and managing transformation, fits the moment. The multilateral system is under strain, and the countries that bear the highest costs of that strain are mostly in Asia and Africa.

From where we sit, the most striking feature of this Assembly was that Asia and Africa have moved from asking for a voice to asking for a share of power. Asia spoke as a region that already holds economic weight. India’s External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar framed the challenge as a “4F crisis” of food, fuel, fertiliser and finance hitting the Global South hardest, and warned of the “weaponisation” of finance, supply chains and technology. That diagnosis is an Asian one, but it applies equally to Africa.

Africa, for its part, spoke with a coherence we have rarely seen. Observers noted that African leaders have seldom sounded more aligned on rebalancing global power, across UN reform, debt, critical minerals, climate finance and AI. The demands were also concrete. Nigeria called for at least two permanent African seats on the Security Council, with veto rights for as long as the veto exists, and five non-permanent seats in total. Kenya’s President Ruto said a continent of 54 countries and over 1.4 billion people cannot stay on the margins of decisions on global peace and security. Ghana’s President Mahama put it most simply: “Africa does not seek charity. Africa seeks equal partnership.”

In short, Asia arrives at the table as a centre of growth, and Africa arrives as a centre of demography, resources and moral argument. The UN’s credibility over the next decade will depend on whether its institutions reflect this shift or keep resisting it.

Canada and few other countries agreed to establish Platform for Multilateralism (P4M), which includes India and Kenya among others. Hopefully, this Platform will gain speed as the world hurtles forward in an order which is not based on rules but unilateralism. It certainly will challenge the hegemonistic tendencies arising from big powers like the USA and China.

KKK: Is the economic architecture being rapidly transformed in the Asia-Pacific, with links to Russia and the Eurasian space? Is Africa being left out?

PSM: Yes, the transformation is real, and it is now institutional rather than rhetorical. Russia’s economic orientation is one indicator: in the first five months of 2026, 74.8% of Russia’s foreign trade was with Asian countries, and that trade grew 12.4% year-on-year. Regional frameworks are becoming denser too. Trade between the Eurasian Economic Union and SCO countries reached about US$371 billion in 2025, nearly four times the level of a decade earlier, and rose more than 17% year-on-year in the first half of 2026. At the recent SCO summit in Bishkek, President Putin said over 98% of Russian transactions with SCO partners were already settled in national currencies. Connectivity projects such as the International North-South Transport Corridor, together with ASEAN, RCEP and the SCO, are creating a Eurasian and Asia-Pacific economic space with its own corridors, payment channels and rules.

We should be clear-eyed about this, though. The emerging architecture is not a single bloc. Some analysts argue that the Russia-China relationship has become increasingly asymmetric, with Russia effectively a junior partner in a China-led Eurasian order. India, meanwhile, keeps its options open with multiple partners, following the path of strategic autonomy. This is a multipolar and somewhat fragmented architecture, not a new consolidated system.

Is Africa being left out? Not by design, but it risks being included on unfavourable terms. Africa is courted by all of these powers for its minerals, markets and votes. It is less often a co-designer of the corridors, standards and financial plumbing being built. The core weakness is internal fragmentation: intra-African trade still accounts for only 15–18 per cent of Africa’s total trade of around $1.5 trillion, far below comparable levels in Asia and Europe. A continent that trades so little with itself negotiates as 54 small economies, not as one large market.

The remedy is already on the table. As of January 2026, 49 of the 54 AU members had ratified the AfCFTA, though the movement to coalesce is still wanting due to existence of regional economic organisations and status quoism. However, Afreximbank projects intra-African trade to grow 10% in 2026 to $230 billion, helped by the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, which is expected to cut foreign exchange costs by 20–30%. If Africa engages Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific as a single market it will be a pole in this new architecture rather than its periphery.

At a political level, the African Union was admitted as a full member of the G-20 during India’s stewardship of G-20 in September, 2023. However, its full immersion is moving at a  slow pace. That has been made worse as the US has not invited the last Summit host South Africa to the G-20 Summit in USA in November, 2026. There is a considerable resentment in Africa on this.

KKK: What do you see in the coming years? Which economic sectors should African leaders prioritise to secure economic sovereignty? Is Africa experiencing a second “reawakening” in the 21st century?

PSM: We are cautiously optimistic. The fundamentals are improving. After growth of 4.5 per cent in 2025, sub-Saharan Africa entered 2026 with hard-won stabilisation gains, and the IMF expects growth of 4.3 per cent in 2026, even after the Middle East war. But the IMF also warns that the region’s growth remains too weak to deliver income convergence. Debt is the binding constraint: the World Bank reported in April that interest payments now exceed public spending on health or education in four out of five African countries. External market access is also becoming less predictable. AGOA was extended in February 2026 for just a single year.

Economic sovereignty in this environment means choosing where to build capability. From CUTS International’s perspective, drawing on our long engagement in Africa, five priorities stand out.

Mineral value addition. Africa holds about 30 per cent of global reserves of critical energy-transition minerals and produces more than 77 per cent of the world’s cobalt and 65 per cent of its manganese, yet most of this leaves the continent unprocessed. Beneficiation, regional battery and component value chains, and transparent, competitive licensing regimes should be the top industrial priority. Ghana’s warning at UNGA against a new scramble for resources was well placed.

Agro-processing and food systems. Food import dependence was exposed again by this year’s shocks to fuel, fertiliser and shipping. Agriculture employs the most Africans, and processing is the fastest route to jobs and food security.

Energy and industrial infrastructure. Reliable, affordable power, especially renewables where Africa has vast potential, is the precondition for any manufacturing strategy.

Digital public infrastructure and services. Interoperable payments, digital identity and digital trade under the AfCFTA protocol can lower transaction costs faster than physical infrastructure alone. India’s DPI experience offers a practical South-South model.

Financial and regulatory sovereignty. This means a fair restructuring framework and support for borrowers’ coordination on debt; African institutions such as PAPSS and the proposed African credit rating agency; and, often overlooked, strong competition, consumer protection and trade-facilitation regimes. Sovereignty is lost as easily to domestic monopolies and non-tariff barriers as to foreign creditors.

BRICS. The September 2026 summit of BRICS with 11 members and few partners showed that, even in a fragmenting world, like-minded countries can come together and sign on to a declaration which may not be unanimous but consensus can be achieved if members apply their minds. It has already agreed on financial issues without disowning the US dollar. There is also a possibility of a permanent secretariat of BRICS to be established in the near future which will be run by an independent cohort. It would thus fill in the role of what the OECD does for the rich countries in the world as a think tank.

Is this a second “reawakening”? We believe it is, with an important qualification. The first awakening, in the 1950s and 60s, was political: independence and the right to self-rule. The second, now underway, is economic and institutional: the right to shape the rules of trade, finance, technology and resources. The unity Africa displayed at UNGA 81 and the AfCFTA are signs of it. But an awakening becomes a renaissance only through execution: ratifications turned into functioning customs posts, mineral policies turned into factories, and debt relief turned into schools and clinics. African leaders themselves acknowledged in New York that demanding a fairer global order also means putting their own houses in order. If that internal discipline matches the external ambition, the 21st century can indeed be Africa’s.

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Kester Kenn Klomegah, who worked previously with Inter Press Service (IPS), Weekly Blitz and InDepthNews, is now a regular contributor to Global Research. He researches Eurasia, Russia, Africa and BRICS. His focused interest areas include geopolitical changes, foreign relations and economic development questions relating to Africa. As a versatile researcher, he believes that everyone deserves equal access to quality and trustworthy media reports.

Featured image is from the author

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